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#### SECRET IDEALIST/JACKSON

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6 December 1968

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	MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution		
	SUBJECT: SCOPE SAINT Critique		
	OPERATIONS:		
	A critique of the Scope Saint Operation was held in the OSA Control Center on 15 November 1968.  represented Operations and presented a brief review of the purpose of Scope Saint and the sequence of events.		
	WEATHER:		
	briefed the weather portion of the operation. All terminal weather forecasts were accurate. The 24 hour deployment delay and cancellation of the first simulated operational mission on forecast weather at was subsequently justified by observed weather conditions.		
MATERIEL:			
	review of the Materiel portion reflected no discrepancies or required corrective action.		
	COMMUNICATIONS:		
	Following are the Communications problems encountered during the exercise as presented by		
	1. The over-the-counter service at Loring AFB experienced an average of an eight hour delay with the shortest handling time being two hours and sixteen minutes, and the longest handling time was		

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thirteen hours and fifty four minutes. Particular

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problems could not be pinpointed as no definite pattern was obvious. The possibility of utilizing telephone accoustical couplers in the future will permit the transmission of teletype messages over ordinary dial telephone lines. This would eliminate the over-the-counter service and the extremely long delays in handling messages between Loring and Headquarters.

2. Identification cards used by the deploying personnel were not generally honored at Loring as proper authority for freedom of movement of the personnel.

3.	installed circuit was
other than that previously	ordered. This resulted in
delayed activation of commu	nication circuits upon
arrival. In addition, the	U.S. Naval Facility at
was not availabl	le as back up for communica-
tions due to lack of coordi	ination on the part of the
previous Naval Commander.	

- 4. After the initial delay in establishing the required circuits at the message handling time was acceptable and averaged from one hour and two minutes for Immediate to two hours and five minutes for Routine messages.
  - . .

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- 5. For future planning, Communications recommends:
- a. that a Communications representative accompany the advance party visiting all enroute and destination bases;
- b. the use of a prearranged code word to notify the nearest Agency facility of arrival times, or use of an agent type radio to pass this information to the nearest Agency radio station;
  - c. future predeployment teams will carry and

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actually pass test scrambled messages through the host base facilities to determine the acceptability of those facilities to clearly transmit via this method:

- d. use of telephone accoustical coupler to transmit messages via teletype or telephone lines to stations within CONUS:
- additional surface transportation for Communications personnel at enroute stations.

#### INTELLIGENCE:

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Intelligence was represented by this was an overt exercise, no cameras or systems were installed and there was no intelligence data gathered.

#### KWCACTUS:

the representative from showed several slides of the physical layout at including some of the buildings and other base facilities. Many problem areas were covered, especially the potential new problem areas that would be encountered if a U-2R model should be deployed at a later date. Included in these problem areas were the use of various materiel adapter kits such as nitrogen, hydraulic mule, three phase 400 cycle power cart (required for the "R" model) and the use of equipment

> 2. Mobile control can only be accomplished by placing an officer as an observer in the tower.

for loading and off loading the support aircraft.

3. Billeting the KC-135 crew poses a potential security problem for a covert exercise. In addition, the Phase I kit is very difficult to fit in the KC-135, therefore, a C-141 aircraft should be considered for future deployments.

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25X1C suggested that for future over water deployments, the U-2 file and fly the same route as the support aircraft. This would aid the U-2 in over the water navigation. JACKSON: 25X1A reviewed the Scope Saint Operation as viewed by the JACKSON personnel at [ They appeared to be very well pleased and satisfied 25X1C with the over all Scope Saint Operation. They expressed a desire to execute another similar exercise in the future and possibly use [ with the U-2R configured with an 25X1A Elint package or camera system. Chief, IDEALIST Division, OSA IDEA/OSA laea: (6 Dec 68) 25X1A Distribution: #1 - D/SA#2 - D/O/OSA#3 - WEA/OSA

> #4 - IDEA/OSA #5 - D/M/OSA #6 - COMMO/OSA #7 - INTEL/OSA #8 - SS/OSA #9 - SAS/OSA

#11 - Holdback

#10 - RB

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